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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3764 
___________ 
 
IRVING COURTLEY JONES, 
                                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA FIRE DEPARTMENT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-06916) 
District Judge: Honorable J. William Ditter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 9, 2014 
 
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 13, 2014 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Irving Jones appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting the City of 
Philadelphia’s motion to dismiss.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.  
I. 
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 Jones, a 57 year-old African American male, brought this action against the City 
of Philadelphia, alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.1
II. 
  Jones applied 
to be a firefighter with the City of Philadelphia Fire Department, passed the written 
examination, and was thereafter invited in for an interview.  Despite his qualifications, 
which include prior civil service employment, a bachelor’s degree, master’s degrees in 
teaching and divinity, and a juris doctorate, he was not selected for employment.  
According to Jones, he received notice that his name was removed from the list of 
eligible candidates under § 10 of the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations: Dismissed 
from prior employment for inefficiency, delinquency or misconduct.  Jones believes that 
the City refused to hire him because of his age and race.  To further bolster his claim, 
Jones alleged that he observed “hundreds of minority candidates” taking the examination, 
but only “twenty minority candidates reported to the training center.”   
 The District Court dismissed Jones’s original complaint for failure to state a claim, 
but gave him 30 days to amend.  Jones subsequently filed an amended complaint, which 
the City moved to dismiss.  In its motion to dismiss, the City explained that it had 
deemed Jones to be unqualified for a firefighter position under Philadelphia Civil Service 
Regulation Section 10, because he was terminated from past employment as a substitute 
teacher.  The District Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, and this timely appeal 
followed.  
 
                                              
1 Evidently, Jones received a right to sue letter from the EEOC in March 2013.   
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 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s order dismissing Jones’s complaint.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal, the complaint needed to “contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a 
substantial question, see I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
 To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination for failure to hire on 
the basis of age and race, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she is a member of a 
protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was not hired; and (4) that, under 
circumstances that raise an inference of discriminatory action, the employer continued to 
seek out individuals with qualifications similar to his or hers to fill the position.  See 
Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).  But to survive a 
motion to dismiss, he merely needed to “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].”  Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citations 
omitted).     
 As the District Court correctly concluded, Jones failed to put forth facts that would 
support the second element above.  In his amended complaint, Jones alleged that he was 
qualified for a firefighter position because of his education and prior civil service 
experience, and because he passed the written examination.  But he concedes in his 
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complaint that he had been terminated from past employment as a substitute teacher, 
which renders him not qualified under the relevant criteria outlined in § 10 of the 
Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations.   
 Moreover, Jones did not satisfy the fourth element.  He stated merely that he 
observed “hundreds of minority candidates” taking the examination, but only “twenty 
minority candidates reported to the training center.”  This suggests nothing about the 
qualifications of the applicants or the age and racial makeup of those who were ultimately 
hired, and he alleges no facts otherwise suggesting discriminatory hiring practices.     
 For the reasons given, the District Court properly dismissed Jones’s amended 
complaint.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir. 
L.A.R.; I.O.P. 10.6.    
 
